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LEVERAGING HYPERGRAPH CONSTRUCTS
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ABSTRACT
In a Flash Mob (FM) a group of people get together in the physical world perform an unpredicted act
and disperse quickly. Cyber Flash Mob (CFM) is the cyber manifestation of flash mob coordinated
primarily using social media. Deviant Cyber Flash Mob (or, DCFM) is a special case of CFM, which
is categorized as the new face of transnational crime organizations (TCOs). The DCFM phenomenon
can be considered as a form of a cyber-collective action that is defined as an action aiming to improve
group’s conditions (such as, status or power). In this paper, we conduct a conceptual analysis of the
DCFMs and model the factors that lead to success or failure with groundings in collective action
and collective identity formation theories. Mathematical constructs of hypergraph are leveraged to
represent the complex relations observed in the DCFM social networks. The model’s efficacy is
demonstrated through a test scenario.
Keywords: cyber crime, cyber security, deviant cyber flash mob DCFM, collective action, social
media, predictive model.
1. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of contemporary forms of
information and communications technology
(ICTs), such as social media, have transformed
the way people interact, communicate, and share
information. This has afforded a fundamen-
tal paradigm shift in the coordination abilities
of people leading to manifestations of cyber-
collective actions (Agarwal, Lim, & Wigand,
2014; Agarwal et al., 2012) in various forms,
whether they are social movements for sociopo-
litical transformation, campaigns for better gov-
ernance through citizen journalism and engage-
ment, or flash mobs (FM) for promoting a cause
or simply entertainment. A flash mob (FM) is a
group of individuals who get together in a pub-
lic place, perform an unusual act, and quickly
disperse. These group acts are often conducted
for the purposes of entertainment, satire, and
artistic expression. (Oxford-Dictionary, July 8,
2004). The first flash mob was created in Man-
hattan in 2003, by Bill Wasik, who is a senior
editor of the Harper’s Magazine. The purpose of
that flash mob as Wasik claimed was ‘‘a social
experiment designed to poke fun at hipsters and
to highlight the cultural atmosphere of confor-
mity and of wanting to be an insider or part
of the next big thing” (Wasik, December 16,
2011). There are many examples of flash mobs
happened after 2003 i.e. Dare to fight a ninja,
Freeze mob in Paris, and Happy Birthday for a
bus driver,.. etc (Kirkland, December 21, 2011).
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Figure 1 Different Forms and Scopes of Cyber Collective Action, i.e., Flash Mobs (FM), Cyber
Flash Mobs (CFM), and Deviant Cyber Flash Mobs (DCFM).
Some FMs were organized locally some of them
internationally like the largest pillow fight flash
mob which was called the International Pillow
Fight Day. It took place on March 22, 2008 and
it was recorded as the world’s largest flash mob
to date with over 25 cities participating around
the globe (Reporter, April 4, 2011).
Cyber flash mobs (CFM) which are the cy-
ber manifestation of flash mobs (see Figure 1),
are known to be coordinated via social me-
dia, telecommunication devices, or viral emails
(Nicholson, 2005). CFMs are self-organized
groups of individuals who get together in cy-
berspace, perform an unpredicted act, and
quickly disperse. Some of the CFMs are or-
ganized for entertainment purpose others can
lead to robberies and thefts. The latter form
of CFM is known as ‘‘Deviant CFM” such as
the ‘‘Bash Mob” that happened in Long Beach,
CA in July 9, 2013 (Holbrook, July 19, 2013).
Deviant CFM (or, DCFM) can be considered
as a form of a cyber-collective action that is de-
fined as an action aiming to improve a group’s
conditions (such as, status or power) (Ludlow,
January 13, 2013). These DCFMs are catego-
rized as the new face of transnational crime or-
ganizations (TCOs) (e.g., ‘‘hacktivist’’ groups)
that can pose significant risks to political, social,
and economic stability (Ackerman et al., 2013).
The DCFM activities can stretch beyond the cy-
berspace, i.e., in physical spaces. For example,
there are two very well known DCFMs that are
mentioned here to highlight the differences in
the scope of their activities:
1. The Comment Flash Mob. (Digits,
February 21, 2012) The case refers to a
February 2012 attack on a number of Wall
Street Journal (WSJ)s Facebook pages by
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one of the groups that claimed to be linked
to the Anonymous hacking group. The at-
tacks were a result of the allegations by
a German WSJ article that suggested the
group had links with Al-Qaeda. The group
solicited participation in the attack and
requested the following message be pro-
moted (by copy and pasting on several
WSJ pages), along with strategies to avoid
getting blocked while posting the message,
‘‘Dear editors of the German Wall Street
Journal, you equated Anonymous with Al-
Qaeda in your February 2012 article and
the related coverage. With this type of cov-
erage you may be able to stir up fear in
the United States, but not in the land of
poets and thinkers! With this comment,
we oppose the deliberate dissemination of
false information and express our displea-
sure with your lobby journalism. We are
Anonymous. We are millions. We do not
forgive. We do not forget. Expect us!”
The attack quickly spread to other German
WSJ Facebook pages before going viral and
affecting the main WSJ Facebook pages.
According to reports, the attacks subsided
in a few hours affecting user experience in
numerous ways, before the group turned
their attention to a Saudi blogger activist.
2. The Flash Mob Cyber Heist. (Dye &
Finkle, May 9, 2013) A more disturbing
example is the $45 million ‘‘flash mob cyber
heist” that took place in two phases on Dec
21, 2012 ($5 million) and February 19, 2013
($40 million) in 27 countries. Hundreds
of ‘‘cashers” around the globe armed with
prepaid debit cards (that were manipulated
by hackers to have no withdrawal limits)
hit the ATMs. Full technical details of the
cyber heist are still obscure, however, cyber
security experts believe such acts typically
come together in Internet forums, where
hackers can exchange or sell information
and recruit others. A great deal of technical
groundwork had to be laid to create the
complex network access needed but the final
stage was quick as a swarm of individuals
hit machines and raked in the cash.
The entire operation is conducted in multi-
ple stages. In the early stages, one or more
geeks install computer viruses inside net-
works, then spend days or weeks gathering
detailed information about a bank’s opera-
tions as they plan the job. As they get ready
to carry out the job, ‘‘carders” produce fake
payment cards by coding the stolen account
numbers onto magnetic strips. Those cards
are distributed to large numbers of ‘‘cash-
ers”, who withdraw money from ATMs.
‘‘Mules” help move the loot across borders,
sometimes in the form of luxury goods that
they purchase with the cash. The ringlead-
ers, who rake in the biggest profits, typically
are at the least risk of getting caught, while
the carders, cashers and mules take on the
highest risk of arrest. After making seven ar-
rests in the New York City, who comprised
the New York cell of the operation, US At-
torney for the Eastern District of New York,
Loretta Lynch said, ‘‘the gangs moved at
the speed of data across the Internet.”
These DCFMs are interesting not only for
scientific research, but also pose non-negligible
concerns for public safety and national security.
Therefore, in this study, we propose to seek
answers to the following research question:
• How decentralized on-line individual actions
transform into collective actions resulting
in Deviant Cyber Flash Mob (DCFM) be-
haviors?
Consequently, this question leads us to seek an-
swers for:
1. What are the necessary conditions that lead
to the emergence of these phenomena?
2. Can we explain the motivation needed for
the subsistence of such coordinated acts?
3. How can we build predictive models of
DCFM behaviors?
Seeking answers to the aforementioned ques-
tions, we make the following contributions in
this article:
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1. We define an emerging socio-technical be-
havior, viz., Deviant Cyber Flash Mob
(DCFM) observed among cyber crimes and
networked violent groups.
2. We identified the factors that lead to the
success or failure of the DCFM and devel-
oped postulates.
3. We designed a socio-computational model
based on these postulates to predict the
trajectory of a DCFM advancing our un-
derstanding of the emerging socio-technical
behavior.
4. We used the hypergraph notation to repre-
sent the inherently multidimensional and
supra-dyadic nature of the interactions man-
ifested by the complex DCFM phenomenon.
5. We present a DCFM scenario to study the
efficacy of the proposed model.
We envision the research will help develop cyber-
security strategies dealing with DCFM behav-
iors at a fundamental social and behavioral level,
contributing towards a synergistic advancement
of the various disciplines for the modern Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICT)
landscape.
Rest of the article is organized as follows. The-
oretical background of the research is discussed
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the research
methodology including mathematical framework
of the model, in-depth treatment of factors gov-
erning success and failure of DCFM, and the
proposed conceptual framework. A DCFM test
scenario is presented in Section 4 to examine the
model’s efficacy. Section 5 concludes the study
with possible future research directions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The phenomenon of Deviant Cyber Flash Mob
(DCFM) increased rapidly since its inception.
As soon as the mobile devices and texting be-
came common in the early 2000s, people real-
ized the potential of these technologies to mobi-
lize individuals to act in a coordinated manner,
possibly disruptively and then quickly disperse
(Cyveillance, December 2, 2013). Theories such
as collective action (Coleman, 1973), collective
identity formation (Klandermans et al., 2002)
(Melucci, 1996), collective decision (Coleman,
1966), social capital (Coleman, 1966), and net-
work modularity (Newman, 2006) have often
been used to explain the group dynamics un-
derlying collective behavior phenomena. These
theories and concepts have been studied in the
past by many researchers, but to the best of our
knowledge never been used to study DCFMs.
Understanding and modeling DCFMs is a chal-
lenging an important research problem that in-
volves identifying the factors that could explain
motivation behind this phenomenon. A system-
atic analysis of the factors would afford model-
ing capabilities to predict success or failure for a
DCFM. Our work is geared toward this direction.
More specifically, by leveraging the collective ac-
tion theory, we develop an analytical/conceptual
framework that operationalizes the identified fac-
tors into a socio-computational model capable
of predicting the outcome of DCFMs. Next,
we briefly review literature on collective action
theory.
Collective action is defined as all activity of
common or shared interest among two or more
individuals (Olson, 1977). Collective action theo-
ries can be traced back to Ronald Coase’s (Coase,
1937) economic explanation on why individuals
are willing to form companies, and partnerships
in business trading other than making bilateral
contracts between individuals. Many years later,
there are many collective action theories devel-
oped such as the Neutrality Theorem (Warr,
1982, 1983), Club Theory (Sandler & Tschirhart,
1980) , Folk Theorem (Rubinstein, 1979), and
the most eminent one, Rational Choice Theory
(Becker, 1976). As the collective action stud-
ies developed, many other approaches emerged
such as the Resource Mobilization Theory (Zald
& McCarthy, 1979; Kerbo, 1982; Ferree, 1992)
that emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s. This
theory was the most influential approach in ex-
plaining the success of collective action. How-
ever, this theory and the Rational choice theory
were criticized for failing to answer the question
as to how social meaning is constructed and how
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it works as a driving force for action. As a reac-
tion to this critique the New Social Movement
Theory (NSMT) emerged. This theory associates
actions with belief systems that revolve around
a set of values and symbols that are specific to
the group (Snow et al., 1986; Johnston et al.,
1994).
In the book by James S. Coleman ‘‘The math-
ematics of Collective Action” (Coleman, 1973),
Coleman proposed a framework for collective ac-
tion and provided 25 mathematical definitions.
Concepts such as power, control, utility, and
interest, defined by Coleman are borrowed in
our proposed model. The concepts have been
appropriately modified to suit the cyberspace,
especially for the DCFM behavior. Contribu-
tions of this paper include revisiting theories and
concepts that have been studied in social science
and assess their applicability to the cyberspace.
Next, we present the methodology driven by
social science theories on collective action and
collective identity formation, to help develop the
conceptual framework to analyze the DCFM. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
examining the DCFM behavior with groundings
in social science theories.
3. METHODOLOGY
In this article, we focus on advancing our un-
derstanding of DCFMs by analyzing the factors
that lead to their success or failure. We develop
an analytical model that is capable of predicting
the outcome of a DCFM. Sociological theories
of collective action and collective identity for-
mation are adopted to model the dynamics of
DCFMs. The analytical framework grounded
in these sociological theories helps explain the
motivation needed to sustain such highly coor-
dinated acts and assimilate factors pertaining
to collective success/failure. Table 1 shows the
symbols that we use in our methodology with
their meaning.
3.1 Modeling DCFM
We provide a conceptual understanding of the
model for predicting DCFM outcome in this sec-
tion. Below, we list high level relations between
the factors that help us assess the motivation
needed to sustain coordinated acts such as the
DCFM and eventually lead to its success or fail-
ure,
1. A DCFM is more important when many
actors are interested in participating. On
the same hand, more actors will be inter-
ested to participate in an important DCFM.
(Circular argument)
2. The interest of an actor in a DCFM in-
creases as the utility gained by participating
increases.
3. The actors who gain more utility will be-
come powerful.
4. Powerful actors are interested in an impor-
tant DCFM. On the same hand, important
DCFMs grab the attention of powerful ac-
tors. (Circular argument)
5. An actor needs control over the event to
become powerful. On the same hand, a
powerful actor would assert greater control
over the DCFM. (Circular argument)
These relations are developed more rigorously
as postulates and mathematical formulations in
the next section.
3.2 Postulates
A Deviant Cyber Flash Mob (DCFM), which is
an instance of the cyber collective action, could
have either of the two outcomes, i.e., success
(1) or failure (0) to achieve its goal (Coleman,
1973). In order for us to know whether a DCFM
will succeed or not, we propose five postulates
that capture the relations between the factors
identified in section 3.1 above.
Postulate 1:
If the importance (Im) of DCFM increases,
then the interest (I) of the actors to participate
increase. Using the logical implication symbol
(→), this relation can be expressed as:
Importance(Im)→ Interest(I)
If the number of interested (I) actors in a DCFM
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Table 1 The Symbols Used in the Methodology With Their Meaning
Symbol Meaning
Im Importance of the DCFM
C The control of an actor over DCFM
U The utility the node gets from the DCFM outcomes
I The interest of the nodes interested in the DCFM
P The power of the node
J Actor (node)
increase, then the importance (Im) of the DCFM
increases. Using the logical implication symbol
and logical equivalence symbol (↔), this relation
can be expressed as:
Interest(I)→ Importance(Im)
∴ Importance(Im)↔ Interest(I) (1)
Postulate 2:
If the amount of utility (U) gained by partici-
pating increases, then the interest (I) of an actor
in the DCFM will increase. This relation can be
expressed as:
Utility(U)→ Interest(I)
Postulate 3:
If the amount of utility (U) gained by partici-
pating in the DCFM increases, then the actor’s
power (P) will increase. This relation can be
expressed as:
Utility(U)→ Power(P )
Postulate 4:
If the actor is powerful (P), then (s)he will be
interested in important (Im) DCFMs. This can
be expressed as:
Power(P )→ Importance(Im)
If the DCFM is important (Im), then powerful
(P) actors will be interested in participating.
This relation can be expressed as:
Importance(Im)→ Power(P )
∴ Power(P )↔ Importance(Im) (2)
Postulate 5:
If the actor is powerful (P), then (s)he will
assert more control (C) on the DCFM. This
relation can be expressed as:
Power(P )→ Control(C)
If the actor asserts more control (C) on the
DCFM, then (s)he will be powerful (P). This
can be expressed as:
Control(C)→ Power(P )
∴ Power(P )↔ Control(C) (3)
The above postulates lead to the following
formulations:
Power(P ) = f(C, Im)
Importance(Im) = f(Interest)
Interest(I) = |Uoutcome1 − Uoutcome0|
∴ Power(P ) = f(C, |Uoutcome1 − Uoutcome0|)
Or,
∴ Power(P ) = f(C, I) (4)
We posit that in order for a DCFM to succeed it
needs to have many powerful actors interested
in outcome (1). The sum of the powers of all
the actors that are interested in the DCFM will
give the amount of importance of that DCFM.
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Figure 2 Postulates Showing all the Factors that Help in Determining the Outcome of a DCFM,
i.e., Success or Failure.
If that amount of the summation of power equal
to a threshold value (which can be calculated
from the historical data of known cyber flash
mobs that succeeded in the past) then it will be
easy to determine whether a DCFM is going to
succeed or not.
Im =
m∑
1
Pj > Threshold V alue (5)
The summation of powers will be a scalar value
that shows how many actors (nodes) control
the DCFM and are interested in the outcome
1 (because their utility will increase). Figure 2
shows all the postulates together. Next, we
discuss the two cases of success and failure of
DCFM in more depth.
3.3 The Case of DCFM-Success
To model the formation of a DCFM, it is essen-
tial to understand the source of motivation of
the individuals that coordinate the act. Shared
orientations among individuals often form the
basis for motivation resulting in collective ac-
tions (Melucci, 1989) (Maheu, 1995). Shared
orientations among individuals induce a sense
of belongingness to the group giving rise to the
group’s collective identity. Social dimensions
(Tang & Liu, 2010), such as affiliations, inter-
ests, time, location, among others, are the shared
orientations that govern the relationships among
individuals coordinating a DCFM. Individuals
may be connected along one or more social di-
mension, resulting in multiple shared orienta-
tions and hence a stronger collective identity
(see Figure 3). It is important to note that
such relations are supra-dyadic and multidimen-
sional that are best modeled using hypergraph
(Bonacich et al., 2004).
Simple graphs, although efficiently capture
the dyadic relations among a set of nodes, are
severely challenged in modeling supra-dyadic
and multidimensional relations commonplace in
DCFM settings. To illustrate these limitations
of simple graphs, let’s consider a collaboration
network represented using a simple graph, where
nodes denote authors and edges denote collab-
orations between the authors. Such a represen-
tation would tell us whether any two authors
have collaborated or not. However, we cannot
know whether three or more authors connected
to each other collaborated on the same article. A
bipartite graph can possibly be used to address
this limitation by creating two different sets of
nodes one denoting authors and the other de-
noting articles. The edges connecting the nodes
across the two sets would denote the collabora-
tion relationship among authors. However,
1. Such a representation does not allow study-
ing network properties that require homo-
geneity among nodes, e.g., connectivity,
centrality, and other structural/topological
properties.
2. Such a representation only allows us to
model the situations where relations among
the actors are governed by a single common
process. Relationships governed by mul-
tiple processes such as, the relationships
between actors coordinating an act based
on time and location of the event and their
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Figure 3 Factors That Lead to The Case of DCFM-Success.
Figure 4 Factors That Lead to The Case of DCFM-Failure.
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affiliations could not be modeled by a single
bipartite graph. Using n-partite graphs to
model n-processes governing relations be-
tween actors is a possible but extremely
complicated and unscalable solution.
So for such a complicated system we repre-
sented it using hypergraph notation because
simple and bipartite or n-partite graph would
not be sufficient to represent multidimensional
and supra-dyadic relations that this system
has (Estrada & Rodriguez-Velazquez, 2006)
(Bonacich et al., 2004).
3.4 The Case of DCFM-Failure
In his book entitled, ‘‘The Logic of Collective Ac-
tion”, Mancur Olson (Olson, 1977) put forward
a single basic premise of collective action: ‘‘...in-
dividual rationality is not sufficient for collective
rationality...” (Sandler, 1992). Olson’s classic
book (Olson, 1977) is mostly concerned with
explaining and illustrating how collective fail-
ure results when individuals pursue self-interest.
Olson’s argument is essentially based on the as-
sumption that every individual acts rationally,
but if the individuals as a group chooses not to
act rationally−with respect to individual costs
and benefits−no collective action would occur.
So, if an actor has control on DCFM, but does
not have an interest in the success of DCFM
then the actor has two choices, i.e., (s)he ei-
ther withdraws from the DCFM or assert power
exchange with other members of DCFM (to
gain control over other events (DCFMs) or to
gain social capital) (see Figure 4). By doing
so the social capital of the individual will in-
crease while the power on that DCFM might
decrease. Social Capital is defined as ‘‘the value
that one gains from personal connections such
as membership in a family, an ethnic association,
elite clubs, or other solidarity groups”, as stated
by the French economic and cultural sociolo-
gist Pierre Bourdieu (Coleman, 1973) (Coleman,
1966) (Bourdieu, 2002) (Ellison et al., 2007). It
should be noted that an actor may lose interest
in the DCFM’s success, if (s)he does not perceive
any gain in utility by acting in the DCFM.
If some of the actors in the DCFM are not
interested in participating and they do not
have control over the outcome then they will
have two choices, i.e., either they withdraw or
withdraw and act against the group (Coleman,
1973) (see Figure 4). DCFMs can have two
possible models: a flat model when the bene-
fits/utilities of the action are equally distributed
between all the actors (nodes) who are partic-
ipating in the collective action. Or, DCFMs
could assume a hierarchical model for distribu-
tion of the benefits/utilities of the action. In
such a hierarchical model, benefits/utilities are
disproportionately distributed among the group
members. Further, higher the rank of the mem-
ber the more benefits/utilities the member has.
Imaginably, withdrawal of actors from a DCFM
with a hierarchical model (especially at the top
of the pyramid) will have a bigger effect than
the withdrawal of the individual from a DCFM
with a flat model.
3.5 Proposed Conceptual
Framework
First, DCFM data need to be collected from
online social networks. Second, this data need
to be explored to find out what kind of informa-
tion we can extract about the users (i.e. identify
the shared orientations between group members
like social dimensions such as their interest, lo-
cation, time, and affiliations). Third, this data
need to be explored to find out what kind of
information we can extract about the DCFM
itself (i.e. the number of users involved in that
flash mob, whether it succeeds or not, etc.). The
more shared orientations that exist among the
members of the group the stronger is the collec-
tive identity (Klandermans et al., 2002) because
shared orientations among individuals induce
a sense of belongingness to the group giving
rise to the group’s collective identity. Melucci
(Melucci, 1996) argues that the collective iden-
tity formation is the intermediate process for
the manifestation of contemporary forms of col-
lective actions in the information age. Figure 5
illustrates the proposed conceptual framework.
After that we will use hypergraph to represent
this complex system. Formally, a hypergraph is
a generalization of a graph, where an edge can
c© 2014 ADFSL Page 121
JDFSL V9N2 Developing a Conceptual Framework for ...
Figure 5 Proposed Conceptual Framework Illustrating a Step-wise Methodology to Predict the
Outcome of DCFMs.
connect any number of vertices. A hypergraph
H is a pair H = (X, E) where X is a set nodes
or vertices, and E is a set of non-empty subsets
of X called hyperedges (Berge & Minieka, 1973).
A simple graph can be considered as a special
case of hypergraph, where each hyperedge has a
cardinality of 2. So let A be the Incidence ma-
trix (m× n) of the social network (DCFM data
that contain users and the relations between
them), where rows represent nodes (vertices)
and columns represent hyperedges (relations).
Matrix A will be used to identify the motiva-
tion factors (shared orientations ‘‘Social Dimen-
sions”). For each node we need to determine
whether it is interested in outcome 1 or outcome
0 (the question whether the node’s utility will
increase or decrease by each outcome). The util-
ity of the actors (nodes) of the deviant cyber
flash mob can be estimated from:
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1. Historical data (examine the nodes of the
deviant cyber flash mob historically par-
ticipated in previous DCFM. If they did
participate in that flash mob that indicate
a strong interest of those nodes in acting in
the current cyber flash mob and that their
utility will increase by participating),
2. Server logs.
3. Clustering coefficient (The higher the clus-
tering coefficient the more that node share
common orientation and is willing to in-
crease its utility).
Let Y be the relative utility difference matrix
(m× n) of the network where yji will have pos-
itive value if actor j favor participation based
on hyperedge i. Similarly yji will have negative
value if actor j favor not to participate based on
hyperedge i. Uj1i is the utility of actor j gained
by participating in the DCFM from hyperedge
i. Uj0i is the utility of actor j gained by not
participating in the DCFM from hyperedge i,
such that:
yji =
Uj1i − Uj0i∑
i |Uj1i − Uj0i|
(6)
4. A DCFM SCENARIO
To study the proposed model’s efficacy, we
present a DCFM scenario. Let the DCFM sce-
nario be - On March 15, 2014 at 11 am, all
students who study at University Z, their age is
more than 30, they live in Little Rock AR, and
have red cars should go to Walmart Parking lot
which is located in Dallas TX, and dance in the
parking lot. Each participant will get $300 for
participating in this event.
This event (DCFM) has two outcomes:
1. Participate, Success (1)
2. Not participate, Fail (0)
Also this DCFM has two hyperedges (i)
1. Cost
2. Time
Actor j has utility by participating (1) and also
has utility by not participating (0).
Case 1
• Actor j utility if he decided to participate
(1) in this DCFM:
1. If the trip will cost actor j $500 then
($500 - $300 actor j will gain by at-
tending = $200) So Actor j will lose
$200.
2. Because of the time of the trip Actor j
will miss his midterm exam. (if actor
j midterm exam in the same date)
• Actor j utility if he decided not to partici-
pate (0):
1. Actor j will not lose $200.
2. Actor j will not miss his midterm
exam.
The relative utility difference will be negative
because:
yjcost =
Uj1cost − Uj0cost∑
cost |Uj1cost − Uj0cost|
yjcost =
0− 1∑
cost |0− 1|
yjcost = −1
yjtime =
Uj1time − Uj0time∑
time |Uj1time − Uj0time|
yjtime =
0− 1∑
time |0− 1|
yjtime = −1
So
Y=

j .. .. Vn
Cost −1 .. .. ..
T ime −1 .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. ..

Case 2
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• Actor j utility if he decided to participate
(1) in this DCFM:
1. If the trip will cost him $200 and he
will get $300 that means he will gain
$100.
2. He is free on this time.
• Actor j utility if he decided not to partici-
pate (0):
1. He will not gain $100.
2. He will be bored and miss all the fun.
In this case the relative utility difference will
be positive because:
yjcost =
Uj1cost − Uj0cost∑
cost |Uj1cost − Uj0cost|
yjcost =
1− 0∑
cost |1− 0|
yjcost = +1
yjtime =
Uj1time − Uj0time∑
time |Uj1time − Uj0time|
yjtime =
1− 0∑
time |1− 0|
yjtime = +1
So,
Y=

j .. .. Vn
Cost +1 .. .. ..
T ime +1 .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. ..

Going back to the proposed conceptual
framework, let X represents the interest matrix
(m× n) of the nodes in the network. We take
the absolute value of yji and use it to represent
the interest of a node in the flash mob xji (The
interest of an actor in a flash mob is his utility
difference from both the outcomes will make to
him or the importance of the outcome for him).
xji = |yji| (7)
∑
i
xji = 1.0 (8)
From the interest matrix X now we know how
many nodes are interested in outcome 1 and how
many nodes are interested in outcome 0.
We also need to calculate the control (Cji) of
each node on the DCFM. We use the control
matrix C (m × n) to represent that and Cji
values can be obtained by using the eigenvector
centrality measure (Bonacich et al., 2004) .
Centrality measure of nodes CN = AA
T (9)
Centrality measure of hyperedges CE = A
TA
(10)
Now the importance of a DCFM (Ludlow, Jan-
uary 13, 2013) which is a function of the control
and interest can be obtained using the following
algebraic expression:
Importance (Im) =
m∑
1
Pj > Threshold V alue
In matrix notation, when we have a system
of m-equations:
Importance (Im) = X.CN (11)
5. CONCLUSION &
FUTURE WORK
In this study, we focused on the flash mob phe-
nomena and showed the different forms and
scopes that it can assume. We developed a con-
ceptual model for the deviant cyber flash mob
(DCFM) grounded in the theories of collective
action and collective identity formation. Mathe-
matical constructs of hypergraph are leveraged
to represent the complex multi-dimensional and
supra-dyadic relations manifested in the DCFM
social networks. We identified the necessary con-
ditions and motivations that lead to the emer-
gence of these phenomena such as interest and
control. By studying the factors that lead to
the success and failure of a DCFM, we envision
the development of a predictive model. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study
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examining the DCFM behavior with groundings
in social science theories.
Although the model’s efficacy is demonstrated
through a DCFM scenario, our immediate fu-
ture directions include empirical validation of
the model and its sensitivity analysis vis-a-vis
the parameters (e.g., power threshold, etc.) us-
ing real-world data for DCFMs. This research
will help understand and advance cybersecurity
strategies at a fundamental social and behav-
ioral level. The research is of potential interest
to sociologists, anthropologists, and information
system experts exploring the influence of social
systems on user behaviors; studying ties between
people, technology, and institutions; examining
organizational structures, roles, and crowd pro-
cesses.
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